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By What Measure?: The Issue of Damages For Wrongful Pregnancy
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a significant number of American couples de-
liberately attempting to avoid parenthood through various methods of
birth control.' As part of this trend, sterilization operations have become
a common and accepted means of preventing birth of unwanted children.
This increase in voluntary sterilization2 inevitably has been accompanied
by situations in which the effort to prevent conception has been unsuc-
cessful, frustrated through another's negligence.
The courts have responded to this new reality by recognizing a cause
of action of wrongful pregnancy (or wrongful conception).3 Conse-
quently, in the last decade, an extensive body of case law has developed
concerning the tort of wrongful pregnancy.4 Although courts are recog-
nizing this cause of action, they are sharply divided over the issue of
1. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9 1984, at 29, col. 1. The National Center for Health Statistics
reported that in 1982 18% of couples with one partner of child bearing age used sterilization to avoid
conception, 16% used birth control pills, 7% used condoms, 5% used diaphragms, and 4% used
intrauterine devices.
2. Among couples who wanted no more children, as opposed to those couples who merely
wanted to delay child rearing, the use of sterilization more than tripled between 1965 and 1982, from
18% to 62%. Id., col. 4.
3. Wrongful pregnancy is an action brought by the parents of a healthy but unplanned child
against a physician alleging that the physician negligently performed the sterilization procedure
which proximately caused a postoperative unwanted pregnancy.
4. Of the twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia having considered the question, all
but two of these jurisdictions have recognized a wrongful pregnancy cause of action: Boone v. Mul-
lendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court,
136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (en bane); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568
(1982); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187
Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Flowers v. District
of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (per
curiam); Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Nanke v. Napier,
346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985);
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429
(1984); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 412
Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977);
Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442
A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1981); Weintraub v.
Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 410 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); Pierce v. Piver, 45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320,
appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 375, 282 S.E.2d 228 (1980); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356
N.E.2d 496 (1976) (per curiam); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982);
Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d
411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley v. Wierd-
sma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
The Fourth Circuit and Wisconsin have refused to recognize a wrongful pregnancy cause of ac-
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damages. A particularly troublesome issue has been awarding costs for
rearing a healthy child. Courts have adopted positions that range from
no recovery to the full recovery of all consequential damages including
the costs of raising a healthy child to adulthood.5 Courts differ in both
their awards and their reasoning, causing one commentator to note that
"this area of law now seems to contain more rules for limiting wrongful
[pregnancy] damages than it contains wrongful [pregancy] cases.",
6
This Comment argues that awarding damages that include the total
harm resulting from the interference with the parents' rights is proper
and suggests that public policy considerations articulated by some courts
do not justify a denial of full parental compensation. Part II of this Com-
ment describes the various factual situations that give rise to the cause of
action of wrongful pregnancy. Part III analyzes the various judicial ap-
proaches used to measure damages for the tort. Included in this section
are discussions of the doctrine of mitigation, the benefits rule, public pol-
icy, and motivational analysis. This Comment concludes that courts fac-
ing a wrongful pregnancy plaintiff should extend their full consideration
to the costs and benefits of raising a healthy, yet unwanted child, and
award damages for all economic losses, including financial expenses for
rearing the child and for pain and suffering.
II. THE CAUSE OF ACTION
An action for wrongful pregnancy is generally a negligence action
7
brought by parents of a healthy' but unwanted and unplanned child
tion. McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (construing Virginia
law); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
5. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974) (no
recovery allowed; cause of action not recognized); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala.
1982) (recovery limited to expenses up to and including the time a healthy child is born and denied
child rearing costs); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (proof of all
damages including child-rearing costs permitted, but offset equal to the benefit derived by parents
from raising a child is required); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 318-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463,
473-78 (1967) (recovery of all costs associated with an unplanned pregnancy and birth of a child
including costs of child rearing).
6. Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy
Infant, 68 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1982) (the commentator refers to wrongful pregnancy as wrong-
ful birth).
7. Negligence may be pleaded in the alternative to a claim of breach of contract or warranty,
or misrepresentation. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (misrepresenta-
tion); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1984) (breach of warranty); Cox v.
Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (breach of contract).
Sometimes only breach of contract is alleged. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123,
255 N.W. 620 (1934).
8. Occasionally the child is physically or mentally impaired. Such an impairment may have
been anticipated. See infra note 11. The impairment also could have been unanticipated. See La
Point v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118, 119 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (child born with umbilical hernia following
failed tubal ligation); Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 442, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654
(1984) (child born with club foot following failed tubal ligation).
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol16/iss1/5
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY DAMAGES
against a health care worker, usually a physician.9 Typically, the preven-
tion of conception is sought to (1) protect the mother from potential
health problems associated with pregnancy and childbirth;' ° (2) avoid
the birth of a potentially defective child;" and (3) avoid the financial
strain an additional child would place on the family.' 2 The physician is
engaged to provide a service designed to prevent conception or birth.
When this medical assistance is performed negligently, conception is not
prevented, and the pregnancy and birth of an unexpected, unwanted, and
healthy child results.
In the majority of wrongful pregnancy claims, the negligence occurs
before conception. Typical examples include misprescribed or misfilled
birth control pill prescriptions,' 3 failed contraceptive devices,"' and un-
successful sterilization operations. 5 However, the negligence may occur
9. Although the defendant in most wrongful pregnancy claims is a physician, others such as a
pharmacist and a manufacturer of condoms also have been made defendants.
10. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (sterilization undertaken to
safeguard plaintiff's health); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 689, 701, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653
(1976) (obstetrician advised plaintiff that abortion was in her best interest due to her emotional
state); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 307, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (1967) (having more
children would have aggravated plaintiff's existing bladder and kidney conditions); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 I11. App. 2d 51, 53, 391 N.E.2d 479, 484 (1979) (plaintiff sought abortion when preg-
nancy constituted a serious threat to her life); Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 123-24, 255
N.W. 620, 621 (1934) (plaintiff experienced great difficulty with the birth of her first child and was
advised that another pregnancy would endanger her life); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 41,
356 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1976) (per curiam) (plaintiff with history of diabetes, obesity, and miscarriages
was advised to undergo sterilization to avoid the hazards of another pregnancy).
11. See Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 254-55, 445 A.2d 883, 883-84 (1982) (after giving birth
to two children with orthopedic defects, plaintiff decided to undergo sterilization to avoid the birth
of another child with the same defect); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 1984) (plaintiff
bore two children with severe abnormalities and decided not to have another because of fear of
birthing another deformed child); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 82, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (1981) (after
the birth of two children who inherited neurofibromatosis, the father decided to undergo a vasec-
tomy to avoid the possible birth of another child with the same defect).
12. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 581, 667
P.2d 1294, 1296 (1983) (en banc); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C.
1984); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136
N.J. Super. 69, 74, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (Law Div. 1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 972 (1974).
13. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 244, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (pharmacist negligently
substituted tranquilizers for birth control pills).
14. See, e.g., J.P.M. v. Schmid Laboratories, 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (App. Div.
1981) (per curiam) (condom failed to prevent pregnancy); Jackson v. Baumgardner, 71 N.C. App.
107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), disc. rev. granted, 312 N.C. 797, 325 S.E.2d 486 (1985) (intrauterine
device negligently not maintained in place).
15. In the majority of cases, the female was negligently sterilized by a tubal ligation or tubal
cauterization. See McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Hartke v.
McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); White v. United States, 510
F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (construing Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala.
1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135
Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982);
Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d
8 (Del. 1975); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Public Health Trust v.
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after conception and preclude termination of the pregnancy, -such as
when pregnancy is not diagnosed in the first trimester 16 or an abortion is
unsuccessful. 7
Most wrongful pregnancy claims are brought by victims of an unsuc-
cessful sterilization procedure, a tubal ligation in females or a vasectomy
in males.18 When parents are able to prove that the doctor's negligence
was responsible for the unsuccessful operation and ensuing conception of
an unwanted child, the courts confront the difficult task of determining
the damages required to redress the injury suffered by the parents. Ac-
cepting that creation, "particularly the creation of a normal healthy
human, can in any way be wrongful has been a strain on the [courts]."' 9
A divergence of opinion in the case law has resulted, reflecting a basic
disagreement on the hierarchy of certain fundamental rights and the diffi-
culty of identifying the nature of the injury in a wrongful pregnancy
claim.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981);
Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Cockrum v. Baumgart-
ner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (tubal ligation and vasectomy cases consolidated), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 846 (1983); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984);
Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (defendant substituted another procedure
for the tubal ligation to which plaintiff consented); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465,
432 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1981) (defendant substituted another procedure for the tubal ligation to
which plaintiff consented); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (Law Div. 1975);
Pierce v. Piver, 45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 375, 282 S.E.2d 228
(1980); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (per curiam); Mason v. Western
Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Stribling v. DeQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d
239 (1980); Terrel v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 972
(1974); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash.
2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
In a number of cases the male was negligently sterilized by a vasectomy. See University of Ariz.
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (en banc); Wilbur v.
Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Mag-
gard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83
Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 621 (1934); Weintraub v. Brown, 98
A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980);
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam) (unsuccessful vasectomy in hus-
band and subsequent unsuccessful abortion); Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602
(1976); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
16. See Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (per curiam), appeal dismissed,
412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
17. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 689, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Wilczynski v. Good-
man, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984).
18. See cases cited supra note 15.
19. Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C.L. REV. 759, 761 (1982).
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The underlying principle behind any award of damages is that the per-
son who causes an injury should make the victim whole to the extent
possible. The injured plaintiff is returned to the position he would have
occupied had the injury not occurred. 20 Therefore, the tortfeasor is liable
and must compensate his victim for any and all damages that are the
natural and probable consequences of his negligence. 2 However, courts
may limit recovery on the basis of either certain rules of law22 or public
policy considerations.23
In wrongful pregnancy claims the courts have awarded damages based
on a broad range of measures: the cost of the failed surgical procedure;
24
the physical and mental pain and suffering of the mother during preg-
nancy and delivery; 25 the medical expenses associated with pregnancy
and delivery;26 the lost wages of the mother during pregnancy and the
immediate period after delivery;27 the husband's loss of consortium dur-
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a, § 903 comment a (1979).
21. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 43, at 282 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 918-923 (1979).
23. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, § 3.
24. See Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb
Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H.
237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 421, 687 P.2d 850,
856 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650
P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
Some courts also award the costs of an additional sterilization. See Flowers v. District of Colum-
bia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1985).
25. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia,
478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. App. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443,
314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Kings-
bury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465,
472, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (App. Div. 1981); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 486, 453 A.2d
974, 976 (1982); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); McKer-
nan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 421, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d
872, 877 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
26. See White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D. Kan. 1981); Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441,
443, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654; Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Miller v.
Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442
A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 472, 432 A.2d 556, 560 (App. Div.
1980); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); Mason v. Western
Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 486, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,
421, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1985).
27. See Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb
Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627
S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006
(1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 472, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (App. Div. 1981); Mason v.
Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 486, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d
872, 877 (W. Va. 1982); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
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ing pregnancy and the immediate period after delivery;"8 the financial
costs of raising, educating and maintaining the unplanned child;29 and
emotional distress.3 ° Under established tort principles, all of the above
injuries are foreseeable consequences of negligence that result in the con-
ception and birth of unplanned children. Still, each jurisdiction has de-
veloped its own measure of damages, often encompassing rules for
limiting wrongful pregnancy damages. In arriving at their decisions,
courts consider society's interest in (1) encouraging an attitude of rever-
ence for human life; (2) holding parents responsible for the care of chil-
dren they bring into society; (3) improving the quality of human
existence; (4) protecting the procreative rights of individuals; (5) holding
tortfeasors liable for damages proximately caused by their actions; and
(6) encouraging competent medical care.31 In reconciling these conflict-
ing interests, some courts emphasize traditional tort theories of recovery
while others rely more heavily on public policy factors. Hence, no con-
sensus has developed on the issue of what damages the wrongful preg-
nancy plaintiffs should recover.32
A. No Recovery
The question of liability of the physician for negligent sterilization
aside, damages resulting from the birth of a healthy unplanned child
28. See White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981); Boone v. Mullendore,
416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443, 314
S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Miller v.
Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442
A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 472, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (App. Div.
1981); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 420 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); Mason v. Western
Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 486, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,
421, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1982).
29. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 584, 667 P.2d
1294, 1299 (1983) (en banc); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 35-37, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76,
82-83 (1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 598, 609, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (1976); Cus-
todio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187
Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 128-29, 366
A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984); Clapham v.
Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 61, 300 N.W.2d 727, 734 (per curiam) (awarded damages to grandpar-
ents of minor child's baby), appeal dismissed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169,
176 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 77, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (App. Div.
1975); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 43, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam).
30. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich.
App. 545, 549, 265 N.W.2d 411, 413 (1978); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 470, 432 A.2d 556,
558 (App. Div. 1981); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 77, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (Law Div.
1975); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641-42 (1983).
31. Collins, An Overview and Analysis" Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 695 n.6
(1984).
32. Id. at 679.
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were not recognized prior to 1967. The issue in the earliest wrongful
pregnancy cases was not whether particular elements of damages should
be awarded, but whether the parents of an unplanned and unwanted but
healthy child suffered any damages at all. Early decisions considered the
birth of a healthy child, although unwanted, a blessing to the child's par-
ents. This idea of "the child as a blessing" was first introduced in Chris-
tensen v. Thornby,3" where the court said that "[i]nstead of losing his
wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another
child."34 Subsequent cases have incorporated this rationale because the
courts remained uneasy about encouraging sterilization and family plan-
ning. Therefore, these courts reason that the birth of a healthy child
outweighs as a matter of law any injury that the parents may have suf-
fered from the birth of an unplanned and unwanted child.
The early decisions were based on moral and religious considerations
as illustrated by an observation of the court in Shaheen v. Knight:35 "The
great end of matrimony is not the comfort and convenience of the imme-
diate parties, though these are necessarily embarked in it (sic); but the
procreation of a progeny having a legal title to maintenance by the fa-
ther."3 6 A few courts still refuse to recognize that any injury was suf-
fered by parents of an unplanned healthy child, conceived and born as
the result of a failed sterilization.37 The propriety of this position was
first challenged by a California court in i967.38 Thereafter, most courts
have allowed parents to recover at least some portion of the damages
they claim.
B. Full Recovery
The first court to recognize damages for wrongful pregnancy applied
the most liberal measure of damages. 39 In Custodio v. Bauer,' a Califor-
nia court awarded the parents of a tenth child, born after a negligently
performed sterilization, damages for all pregnancy and birth-related
costs as well as child-rearing expenses. The damages included economic,
physical and emotional costs.4" The Custodio court based its award on
the theory that economic realities often outweigh parental pleasures and
that the injury suffered was not the birth of the child but the financial
33. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
34. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622 (dictum).
35. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
36. Id. at 45.
37. McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200, 1202 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (construing
Virginia law); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1974).
38. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. The Custodio court noted that it would have also permitted
the family an action for wrongful death had the mother died in childbirth. Id.
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consequences that naturally result from an addition to the family.
"[T]he compensation is not for the so called unwanted child. . . but to
replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive
the other members of the family of what was planned as their just share
of the family income."42 Because the court did not view the damages as
deriving from the child's right to life but rather from an injury to the
parents, the court held that the parents could recover "the amount which
will compensate for all detriments proximately caused thereby."43
In Bowman v. Davis,' the Ohio court also awarded full damages, in-
cluding the cost of rearing the child. The Bowman case was unusual
because one twin was born healthy while the other was born with an
unforeseeable congenital abnormality. The court awarded full child-
rearing costs for each of the twins. Courts and commentators cite the
Custodio and Bowman courts as the only courts to allow full recovery for
wrongful pregnancy without a benefits offset. However, other courts con-
tend that Custodio and Bowman do not provide much support for the full
recovery approach.45
In Bowman, the plaintiffs received child-rearing costs as awarded in
the lower court. The Ohio Supreme Court stated in a footnote to the
opinion that "[a] third issue, that appellees' damages should be limited to
the expenses of the pregnancy after a negligently performed sterilization,
was not raised at the appellate level. To the extent that this issue is not
settled in our decision of appellant's other propositions of law, we decline
to decide it."46 The question of the degree to which Custodio stands for
full recovery arises because the California Court of Appeals did not have
a complete set of facts and said "if successful on the issue of liability, [the
plaintiffs] have established the right to more than nominal damages
... .The propriety of further damages must be established under [cer-
tain] criteria as the facts may be developed."47 Nonetheless, this court's
holding makes possible the recovery by parents of all reasonably foresee-
able damages proximately caused by a tortfeasor's act, including the
costs of rearing an unplanned child.
A recent attempt by the Illinois Court of Appeals to award full dam-
ages was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.4" The Illinois Court of
Appeals' primary theory in support of full recovery was that individuals
have a constitutional right not to bear children.49
42. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
43. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
44. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
45. E.g., Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 215-16, 699 P.2d 459, 462 (1985).
46. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 44 n.1, 356 N.E.2d at 498 n.l (emphasis original).
47. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
48. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Il1. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 193,
447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
49. Id. at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
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In more recent cases, courts have not been following the extreme ap-
proaches of denying or awarding full damages. Two middle ground ap-
proaches have developed and are presently being employed by the courts.
In using the first approach, courts focus on public policy considerations.
These courts award pregnancy related damages and deny child-rearing
costs.50 The second approach relies on the application of well-established
tort principles to wrongful pregnancy claims. Courts using this approach
award child-rearing costs and offset them by benefits received.51
C. Partial Recovery - No Child-Rearing Costs
The majority approach to damages in wrongful pregnancy claims is to
award damages related to pregnancy and delivery and deny damages for
the cost of rearing a healthy child. Under this theory, courts allow recov-
ery of some or all of the following: medical and hospital expenses associ-
ated with pregnancy and delivery, physical and mental pain and suffering
of the mother during pregnancy and delivery, costs of the failed steriliza-
tion procedure, lost wages of the mother, and loss of consortium of the
father.5"
The courts that deny child-rearing costs do not view a wrongful preg-
nancy claim as a simple medical malpractice action. These courts em-
phasize that the negligence resulted in the creation of human life while
giving various public policy reasons for holding that an award of child-
rearing costs is inappropriate. The predominant theory used to deny
child-rearing costs is the same theory used by the courts that deny any
recovery, i.e., that a child is a blessing. This theory is articulated using
two expressions with the same meaning. Some courts use a balancing
approach and hold that "the benefits of joy, companionship, and affec-
tion which a normal, healthy child can provide must be deemed as a
50. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison,
349 A.2d 8, 11-12 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), petition denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193,
200, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d
51, 62-63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487-88 (1979); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1984); Byrd
v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 215-16, 699 P.2d 459, 468 (1985); Schork v. Huber, 648
S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); see also supra notes 24-28.
51. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 584, 667 P.2d
1294 (1983) (en banc); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 35-37, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 82-83
(1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 598, 609, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (1976); Ochs v.
Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp.
125, 128-29, 366 A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435
(1984); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 61, 300 N.W.2d 727, 734 (per curiam), appeal dis-
missed, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d
511, 518 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 77, 344 A.2d 366, 340 (Law Div. 1975).
52. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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matter of law to outweigh the costs of rearing that child."53 Other
courts, as a matter of public policy, hold that parents cannot be deemed
to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal healthy
child.54 In other words, "[t]he existence of normal, healthy life is an
esteemed right under our laws, rather than a compensable wrong." 5
Some courts combine both expressions.5 6 These courts reason that a
child must be a blessing since parents chose to raise the child despite the
availability of abortion or adoption. As further support of their position,
these courts also point to the large number of childless couples and single
persons who choose to become parents.
57
Courts and commentators have criticized the "child-as-a-blessing"
view. Arguing that the birth of a child can never be considered an injury
to the parents or that the benefits of child rearing always outweigh the
burdens is fallacious. First, courts adopting this rationale fail to consider
the fact that millions of couples use many contraceptive measures as well
as sterilization to avoid the consequence of pregnancy.5" In many cases,
the benefits of rearing a child do outweigh the burdens, but to assume
that such is true in all cases is unrealistic. 9 Furthermore, the burdens of
child rearing may not only outweigh the benefits, but "the birth of [an
unwanted] child may be a catastrophe not only for the parents and the
child itself, but also for previously born siblings."'
Those courts holding that the benefits of child rearing always outweigh
the burdens and those courts adopting the offsetting benefits theory
equally misapply the Restatement's benefits rule. 6 These courts seem to
53. Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp. 499 Pa. 484, 487, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); accord Fassoulas
v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky.
1983); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982).
54. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 111. 2d 193, 201, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
846 (1983); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 215-16, 699 P.2d 459, 468 (1985); Schork
v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 348-49, 470
N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983).
55. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 64, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979).
56. See Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(parent cannot be deemed to have been damaged by having to raise a normal, healthy child because
the invaluable benefits of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens involved);
accord Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522-23 (Iowa 1984).
57. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aftfd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
58. This argument has been advanced both by courts that award child-rearing costs, see Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977); and by courts that deny child-rearing costs, see McKernan v.
Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 418, 687 P.2d 850, 854 (1984).
59. University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 583, 667 P.2d
1294, 1298 (1983).
60. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 972 (1974).
61. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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combine all economic and emotional considerations into one. While the
emotional benefits may outweigh the emotional burdens whenever an un-
planned but healthy child is born, the same may not be true for economic
benefits. Thus, those courts using "the child is a blessing" theory deny
economic awards to parents because they derive emotional benefits from
their children.62
Another reason for refusing recovery for child-rearing costs stems
from the concern for the welfare of the child in question. Some courts
argue that the child ultimately would be harmed when he finds out that
he was not wanted and was reared with the funds supplied from an-
other.63 Such an award would foster development of what "[s]ome au-
thors have referred to . . .as an 'emotional bastard' in a realistic, but
harsh, attempt to describe the stigma that will attach to him . . ."'
when he inevitably learns that his birth was attributable to a doctor's
negligence rather than his parents' desires. The courts that use this ra-
tionale do not explain how they arrive at this conclusion. Absent empiri-
cal data in support of such contentions, justifying denial of recovery on
the basis of speculation as to the possible psychological harm to the child
is unreasonable. In fact, the mere filing of a wrongful pregnancy lawsuit
and a damage award based on an alternative measure is as likely to cause
the emotional damage feared by courts as is an award of child-rearing
costs. 65 The argument that the child's awareness of an award of rearing
costs will cause or increase his emotional damage is simply not logical.
A child will likely be damaged less by learning of the wrongful preg-
nancy suit than being born into a family which has no funds for educa-
tion, maintenance and support. 66 Denial of child-rearing costs is an
illogical way to show concern for the child when less drastic means such
as protecting the anonymity of the parents are possible.67 In any event,
parents, not courts should weigh the risk of psychological damage to the
unplanned child.68
The state's concern with the harmony of the family unit also serves to
62. For a discussion of the parents' economic and emotional interests, see infra notes 109-15
and accompanying text.
63. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.
239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982)); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn.
1977); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 687 P.2d 850, 855-66 (1984).
64. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 722 (Ala. 1982); accord Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d
568, 571 (1982).
65. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 724-25 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially).
66. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
67. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1976); P. v.
Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1981); J.M.P. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc.,
178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (App. Div. 1981) (per curiam).
68. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1522 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 585, 667 P.2d
1294, 1300 (1983) (en banc); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Minn. 1977).
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deny child-rearing expenses. Courts see such an award as meddling with
the integrity of the family. These courts contend that awarding child-
rearing costs "could have a significant impact on the stability of the fam-
ily relationship"69 and "impede rather than enhance the marital familial
relationship."'70  Of course, the opposite may be true. Any easing of the
economic burden related to the rearing of the unplanned child may pro-
mote rather than disrupt family harmony.
Another objection to the recovery of child-rearing expenses is that
such damages are too speculative and uncertain.7" However, courts that
have rejected this damage limitation contend that difficulty in ascertain-
ment does not justify complete denial of recovery.72 Juries in tort cases
frequently are required to determine intangible damages, both emotional
and pecuniary; therefore, such difficulty is no basis for adopting a new
rule for wrongful pregnancy cases. 73  A related objection is that the
award of child-rearing costs will necessitate the application of the bene-
fits rule at the time of birth which will be an exercise in prophecy 74 and
will present insurmountable problems of proof.75 Yet such calculations,
regularly made by actuaries, are based on well-recognized economic fac-
tors. The costs of rearing a child "are well appreciated by the average
citizen through first-hand experience."76 These calculations, particularly
the benefits offset, may be difficult, but they are no different than the
calculations in wrongful death cases.77
Several public policy reasons for denying child-rearing costs focus on
the burden of unfairness to the physician. In Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co. ,78 the court held that awarding child-rearing costs "would be wholly
69. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 721 (Ala. 1982); accord Wilbur v. Kerr, 27 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d
568, 571 (1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. App. 1984).
70. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 728 (Jones and Shore, JJ., concurring specially); accord Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 201, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
71. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 721 (Ala. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974) (dictum), afid, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1978); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983);
Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102
Wash. 2d 411, 416, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (1984); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo.
1982).
72. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 75-76, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (Law Div. 1975);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1971).
73. University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 582, 667 P.2d
1294, 1297-98 (1983) (per curiam); Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 445, 314
S.E.2d 653, 656 (1984) (Gregory, J., dissenting).
74. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
75. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 972
(1974).
76. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436-37 (1984).
77. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986
(1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299
Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436-37 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261-62, 187 N.W.2d
511, 521 (1976); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
78. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol16/iss1/5
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY DAMAGES
out of proportion to the culpability involved, and ... would place too
unreasonable a burden upon physicians."79 The Rieck court was con-
cerned that an award would create a new category of surrogate parent.8 °
This argument is contrary to well-established tort principles. Tortfeasors
usually are liable for all foreseeable harm naturally flowing from their
negligent acts, and they must take their victims as they find them. Ordi-
narily, damages are not weighed against culpability.8 No rational expla-
nation for such an alteration of tort principles has been found in the
wrongful pregnancy cases to date.
Courts also fear that fraudulent claims will proliferate if child-rearing
costs are awarded.82 However, fraudulent claims can occur only in situa-
tions where failure to promptly diagnose a pregnancy is alleged. In these
cases, parents allege that they would have aborted the fetus had they
been informed of the pregnancy soon enough to do so. The majority of
wrongful pregnancy cases do not lend themselves to fraudulent claims.
The desire not to have any more children is implicit in an attempt at
sterilization. This fraudulent claim argument also indicates a lack of faith
in the jury system. Both the unreasonable burden and the fraudulent
claim arguments "ignore the judicial process which daily meets other
problems of equal difficulty and complexity with commendable
results."83
Among the reasons for denying child support because of unfairness to
the physician is the claim that the damages are too remote to be reason-
ably connected to the alleged negligence.84 The first court to use the "too
remote" reason applied this rationale to damages associated with preg-
nancy and child birth rather than child-rearing costs.85 Subsequent deci-
sions applied the remoteness argument to child rearing costs. Courts
using this argument ignore strong public policy against tortious action
and in support of compensation for such actions. "Once liability is
proven, it is axiomatic that the tort-feasor is liable for all damamges
79. Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 245; accord White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.
Kan. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982); Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
80. Rieck, 64 Wis. 2d at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
81. It is not the defendant's culpability, but rather the consequence of his negligence, that is
at issue. If the defendant has caused a large injury, he must pay a large sum in compensation. It
makes no sense to say that the degree of his negligence should limit the size of the injured
plaintiff's recovery.
Note, supra note 6, at 1320.
82. Id.; Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
83. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 357, 408 A.2d 496, 504 (1979), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
84. See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869,
872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Beardsley v. Weirdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
85. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934) (alleged damages
based on pregnancy and childbirth expenses are normal incidents of childbirth and are too remote
from sterilization performed to protect mother's health).
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which ordinarily and in the natural course of things have resulted from
the commission of the tort."
's6
Some courts have denied child-rearing costs by defining the wrongful
pregnancy cause of action as an action related only to pregnancy. Thus,
these courts conclude that "[iln the main the damages for wrongful preg-
nancy have been established prior to the child's birth."'8 7 However, such
a policy or rule of law would subject physicians to liability for direct,
foreseeable and natural consequences of all negligently performed opera-
tions except sterilization, an illogical result.8
The award of child-rearing expenses is denied by a number of courts
through the determination that such issues should be resolved by the leg-
islature rather than by the courts.8 9 Such an argument, usually the last
presented, is common when courts refuse to take a particular stand.
The use and misuse of public policy to deny child-rearing costs has
been criticized on various grounds. In Wilbur v. Kerr,9° dissenting Justice
Dudley renounced the invocation of public policy because of "the lack of
a standard by which [to] determine when to apply public policy and the
lack of a meaningful definition by which to discover what constitutes
public policy."9 Public policy is subject to changes that occur in society.
In Schork v. Huber,92 Justice Liebson also rejected the invocation of pub-
lic policy when such policy is based on the opinions or beliefs of judges,
because the court's duty is to follow established public policy and not to
formulate new policy.93 "Public policy should not extend to making a
judgment, as a matter of law, that persons have suffered no damages
from the foreseeable consequences of a medical procedure, even though
we judges may believe that the emotional benefits of parenting outweigh
the economic consequences." 94
Strong dissents are found in cases which invoke public policy to devi-
ate from established tort principles because "any decision based upon a
86. Speck, 268 Pa. Super. at 364, 408 A.2d at 508; accord Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
246, 187 N.W.2d 511, 514 (1971).
87. Bushman v. Bums Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 463, 268 N.W.2d 683, 687
(1978); accord White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981); Coleman v. Garrison,
327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affid, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Hickman v. Myers, 632
S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
88. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 269-70, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984).
89. See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 51, 62, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979); Hickman v. Meyers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982). Further objections are raised to recognizing the tort at all, and these objectors likewise
would leave such recognition to the legislature. E.g., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 234, 357
N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1974) (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
90. 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
91. Id. at 245, 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
92. 648 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1984) (Liebson, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 864.
94. Id.
14
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notion of public policy is one about which reasonable persons may disa-
gree."95 The dissenters, like the courts that refuse to invoke public policy
to deny child-rearing costs, apply well-established tort principles to sup-
port wrongful pregnancy claims.
96
D. Partial Recovery: Offsetting Child-Rearing Costs With Benefits
A minority of courts finds that the benefits of having a healthy child do
not necessarily outweigh the burdens.97 When the parents are able to
prove that the defendant's negligence resulted in the birth of a child,
these courts award complete damages, including all expenses incidental
to rearing the healthy child. However, these courts also permit the de-
fendant to prove offsetting benefits conferred upon the parents as the re-
sult of the birth and rearing of a healthy child. The courts that allow
proof of offsetting benefits apply traditional tort principles and cite the
benefits rule. Section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
for some reduction of the plaintiff's recovery if the defendant can show
that his conduct "has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed." 98 The purpose of the rule is to preclude the
plaintiff's possible overcompensation, the basis lying in the equitable
principle of unjust enrichment. In a wrongful pregnancy case, the plain-
tiffs have a healthy child and a substantial damages claim. The applica-
tion of the rule is intended to prevent a windfall to the parents and an
undue financial burden on the physicians.
Courts use several arguments to support the award of child-rearing
costs. A key argument is that a wrongful pregnancy claim is essentially
no different from any other medical malpractice action. Therefore, no
reason exists to distinguish this claim from any other negligence action.99
These courts do not see as their roles the questioning of morals but only
the assessing of damages as in any other negligence case." Illustrative
of this stance is language from Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic:1 °1
[P]retermitting moral and theological considerations we are not per-
95. Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Pearson,
J., dissenting), petition denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981).
96. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 826 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 51.
98. The benefits rule is stated as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in
so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages to the extent that this is
equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
99. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299
Md. 257, 269, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d 511,
516 (1971).
100. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 244-45, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
101. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
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suaded that public policy considerations can properly be used to deny
recovery to parents of an unplanned, healthy child of all damages proxi-
mately caused by a negligently performed sterilization operation . . .
where the purpose of the physician's action is to prevent conception or
birth, elementary justice requires that he be held legally responsible for
the consequences which have in fact occurred.
10 2
The Sherlock court further stated that damages are important because
such damages serve as an added deterrent to negligent performance of
sterilization procedures. 13
Another key argument for awarding child-rearing costs is that com-
plete denial of such damages impairs the parents' constitutional right to
forego reproduction.'O° Courts using this argument generally cite Gris-
wold v. Connecticut'05 and Roe v. Wade '06 for support of the proposition
that a fundamental right exists to limit the size of one's family, to not
procreate. These courts disagree wtih the invocation of public policy ar-
guments to deny child-rearing costs because "public policy cannot sup-
port an exception to tort liability when the impact of such an exception
would impair the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.' 0 7 They
argue that public policy actually favors the plaintiff in a wrongful preg-
nancy case because the right to a personal choice regarding birth control
and family planning is constitutionally protected. In Public Health Trust
v. Brown,'08 Judge Pearson raised this assertion in his dissent, asking rhe-
torically, "if we cannot interfere with an individual's choice to forego the
benefit of parenthood. . . by what reasoning can the majority arrive at a
rule, based on public policy, which effectively nullifies the individual's
choice?"'0 9 Therefore, a minority of courts would not make an exception
for tort liability.
In Troppi v. Scarf,"' the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the bene-
fits rule to a wrongful pregnancy case for the first time. The Troppi court
reduced the amount of damages awarded for economic, emotional, and
102. Id. at 174.
103. Id. at 175.
104. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.
2d 822, 827 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175
(Minn. 1977).
105. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (zones of privacy within fourteenth amendment due process clause are
broad enough to include the right of married couples to use contraceptives free from governmental
interference); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy to use contraceptives
free from governmental interference extended to unmarried persons).
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (due process includes a woman's right to choose to terminate preg-
nancy within first trimester free from governmental interference).
107. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982).
108. 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (Pearson, J., dissenting), petition denied, 399 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 1980).
109. Id. at 1087 (citations omitted).
110. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
16
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physical injury by the benefit accrued to the parents by the birth of the
unplanned child. 1I The Troppi court viewed the economic, physical,
and emotional aspects of parenthood as one interest. Such analysis has
been adopted by most courts that apply the benefits rule.
This application of the benefits rule has been criticized.112 Critics ar-
gue that the non-pecuniary benefits to the parents resulting from the
child's birth may not be properly offset against the pecuniary interest
impaired. The Restatement's definition of "interest" is much narrower:
Damages for pain and suffering are not diminishable by showing that the
earning capacity of the plaintiff has been increased by the defendant's act.
Damages to a husband from loss of consortium are not diminished by the
fact that the husband is no longer under the expense of supporting a
wife. 113
If courts applied the Restatement's definition of interest to wrongful
pregnancy claims, parents' economic injury would not be offset by prov-
ing emotional benefit. Rather, the cost of child-rearing would be offset
by the expected financial benefit of having the child, and emotional dis-
tress damages would be offset by the emotional joys of child rearing. 14
Such an application of the benefits rule also would consider the emo-
tional and intangible costs and detriments which accompany parenthood
such as psychological effects, reduced free time, and added constraints on
activities.
Some courts that recognize the same interest limitation reject its appli-
cation to wrongful pregnancy actions. ' The Troppi court held that
"[s]ince pregnancy and its attendant anxiety, incapacity, pain, and suffer-
ing are inextricably related to child bearing, we do not think it would be
sound to attempt to separate those segments of damages from the eco-
nomic cost of an unplanned child in applying the 'same interest' rule." ' 16
In so holding, the Troppi court further stated that the pregnancy costs
should not be separated from child-rearing costs and, thus, benefits of
child rearing should be used to offset pregnancy costs as well as rearing
costs.
The Troppi approach may have harsh results at times, particularly if
111. Id. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
112. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 588-89,
667 P.2d 1294, 1303-04 (1983) (Gordon, Vice C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Flow-
ers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1080 (D.C. App. 1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting); Fulton-
DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 444, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1984).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1979).
114. See Comment, Damages for Wrongful Birth of Healthy Babies, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 605, 621-
22 n.17 (1983).
115. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (acknowledges the existence of the "same interest" limitation but
does not use the Restatement's narrow definition of "same interest").
116. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
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the plaintiff is denied recovery. For this reason, in Bushman v. Burns
Clinic Medical Center,t" 7 the Michigan court refused to follow Troppi
and held that the damages incurred from the pregnancy and delivery
need not be offset by the benefits received from having the blessing of a
healthy child.' 18
In addition to the "same interest" limitation on the benefits rule,
courts also have considered the application of the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine" 9 to wrongful pregnancy claims.' The avoidable con-
sequences doctrine provides that "one injured by the tort of another is
not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided
by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the
tort."' 12 ' Plaintiffs in wrongful pregnancy cases could avoid all the child-
rearing damages by placing the unplanned child up for adoption. In ad-
dition, the delivery related damages and most of the pregnancy damages
could be avoided by aborting the unplanned fetus. However, the doctrine
requiring injured persons to minimize damages requires only that reason-
able measures be taken to avoid damages. 122 Furthermore, the plaintiff is
not required to take any action to minimize his damages. 123 Religious,
moral, and emotional overtones are associated with a decision to abort a
fetus or place a child for adoption. Therefore, most courts that have
considered the issue have rejected the avoidable consequences doctrine
and have held as a matter of law that requiring plaintiffs in wrongful
pregnancy cases to minimize damages by abortion or adoption would be
unreasonable.' 24
117. 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 663 (1978).
118. Id at 461, 268 N.W.2d at 684 (reference to child-rearing costs as damages for "wrongful
life").
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979).
120. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 728 (Ala. 1982) (Jones and Shore, JJ., concurring
specially); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. App. 1984); Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 203-04, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390-91, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983);
Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974); Mason v. Western Pa.
Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 371, 428 A.2d 1366, 1374-75 (1981) (Brosky, J., concurring).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979).
122. Id. comment c. See generally Trappi, 31 Mich. App. 240, 258, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (quot-
ing MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 35 (1935)) ("If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person
wronged must incur in order to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circum-
stances a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no disability
against recovering full damages").
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 comment a (1979).
124. "[T]he best interest of the child, and the natural instincts of the parent, make it unreasona-
ble to require parents to submit the child in the womb to abortion or the child in the crib to adop-
tion." Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Ky. 1983) (Liebson, J., dissenting); accord, University
of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 586 n.5, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 n.5
(1983) (en banc); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 31, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1982); Stills
v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.
2d 822, 829 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 274, 473 A.2d
429, 438 (1984); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 58-59, 300 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1980) (per
curiam), appeal denied, 412 Mich. 889, 335 N.W.2d 1 (1981); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
18
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In Troppi v. Scarf,'2 5 the court indicated that adoption may have too
great an adverse psychological impact on both the child and the parents.
A strong objection to requiring abortion to minimize damages was ex-
pressed by the dissent in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital.'26 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Brosky stated that "[t]he very suggestion car-
ries a pungent odor of moral depravity. The defendant, whose tortious
act is responsible for the conception of the child, would now force the
termination of its existence so that damages assessed against him might
be minimized."'
127
The avoidable consequences doctrine has been used by some courts to
bar recovery of child-rearing costs. The court in Shaheen v. Knight 128
was the first to suggest adoption as a means of avoiding damages. 129 The
plaintiff's desire to keep the child seemed to be a key factor in the court's
disallowance of child-rearing costs which were the only requested dam-
ages. When the parents do not abort the fetus or place the child up for
adoption, some courts hold that the parents' inaction creates an irrebut-
table presumption that their benefits exceed the burdens caused by the
tort.13 0 Courts that take this position implicitly are ruling as a matter of
law that abortion and adoption are always reasonable measures to avoid
damages.
In Fassoulas v. Ramey,' 3' dissenting Judge Ehrlich strongly disagreed
with the use of the avoidable consequences doctrine to conclusively pre-
sume that parents were benefited from the birth of a healthy unplanned
child. A tortfeasor has to take an injured person as he finds him:
If the parents do not wish to undergo an abortion or adoption, then the
tortfeaser cannot be heard to complain that his damages are greater than
if he had caused a wrongful conception or wrongful birth by a woman
who was willing to abort or place a child up for adoption."' 132
Another approach to the question of reasonableness of avoidance of
damages has been to allow the trier of fact to decide whether failure to
undergo an abortion or select adoption is reasonable or unreasonable. In
260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977);
Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
125. 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
126. 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981).
127. Id. at 371, 428 A.2d at 1374-75 (Brosky, J., concurring).
128. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
129. "Many people would be willing to support this child were they given the right of custody
and adoption, but according to plaintiff's statement, plaintiff does not want such. In our opinion to
allow such damages would be against public policy." Id. at 46.
130. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aftid, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301
(1980) (irrebutable presumption not expressly stated but implied).
131. 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 829 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
19
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Ziemba v. Sternberg,3 3 the court examined the circumstances surround-
ing the woman's refusal to abort and held the refusal reasonable.1 34 The
Ziemba court considered such factors as the stage to which the preg-
nancy had progressed, the health of the woman, and the type of profes-
sional counseling she had received.' 3  The Ziemba court also held that
the right to have an abortion may not be converted automatically to an
obligation to have one.'
36
The Ziemba approach to avoidance of damages is the best approach.
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he Restatement's avoidable conse-
quences rule contemplates a case-by-case determination of whether it
would have been reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiffs to
avoid increasing their injury; and questions of reasonableness are gener-
ally questions of fact, not of law."' 37 In most cases, the trier of fact
should decide the reasonableness of the parents' failure to minimize dam-
ages in light of the facts of each case. Only in cases where reasonable
persons could not differ should the judge rule on the facts as a matter of
law.1
3 8
Further problems in the application of the benefits rule stem from the
proposition that the benefits can offset the damages only "to the extent
that this is equitable.' 39  Because the main benefit derived from
parenthood is the emotional benefit, the more loving the parent, the less
his economic recovery would be. This is hardly an equitable result. '4
Also, an unwanted, unplanned child is a benefit that was not sought by
the parents. The Restatement notes that the purpose of the benefits rule
is not to allow the defendant to "force a benefit on the plaintiff against his
wishes."' 41 However, the benefit offset approach leads to such conse-
quences. "[T]he defendant can be analogized to an officious intermed-
dler, and when he argues that the damages assessed against him should
be offset by the unsolicited benefits of parenthood, the resemblance is
quite striking indeed.'
' 142
133. 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
134. Id. at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Note, supra note 6, at 1328; see also Note, Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences
Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1119 (1985) (proposes that the
Restatement (Second) of Torts intended to leave the issue of mitigation to the jury as indicated by
§ 283 comment c which states that the trier of fact should decide whether one's conduct is
reasonable).
138. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94, at 628 (4th ed. 1983).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
140. "Whatever those child[-rearing expenses] are determined to be, they are simply not reduced
by the satisfaction, love, joy and pride which an unplanned child may provide his parents." Mason
v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 496, 453 A.2d, 974, 981 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment f (1979).
142. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1416
(1977).
20
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Courts that have adopted the rule that child-rearing costs are not re-
coverable as a matter of law usually considered but for various reasons
rejected the benefit offsetting approach. In Kingsbury v. Smith,'43 the
court refused to adopt the benefits rule and argued that logic did not
allow both a detriment and a benefit to result from the identical medical
malpractice. " Yet, the benefits rule would not have been devised if the
same conduct that injures could not simultaneously confer a benefit. In
Beardsley v. Weirdsma,145 the court said that the benefits rule, with its
concomitant balancing, reduces the child to an object, thereby demean-
ing both the child and the courtroom where the case is being tried.
146
However, the benefits rule has been applied in many actions of torts
against a person. In speculating on possible results of the application of
the benefits rule, the Beardsley court foresaw the "ridiculous result that
benefits could be greater than damages, in which event someone could
argue that the parents would owe something to the tortfeasors."' 47 This
argument fails if the "same interest" limitation is applied.
The court in Fulton-Dekalb Hospital Authority v. Graves148 observed
that the use of the benefits rule applied the theory of consequential dam-
ages and consequential benefits to human life and parenthood. The court
was not willing to rely upon such a theory in this area of delicate human
relations. On a related basis, the court in Flowers v. District of Colum-
bia 149 objected to the benefits rule because "a parent seeking to recover
for an unplanned child [would] be strongly tempted to denigrate the
child's value to the extent possible in order to obtain as large a recovery
as possible." 15' Like Beardsley, the Flowers objection loses force when
the "same interest" limitation is applied.
The court in McKernan v. Aasheims ' contended that to determine at
an early state in the child's life whether the birth benefited or damaged its
parents is impossible because "[t]he child may turn out to be loving obe-
dient and attentive, or hostile unruly and callous. The child may grow
up to be President of the United States, or to be an infamous crimi-
nal. '1 52 In Coleman v. Garrison,153 the court simply objected to applying
the rule because such application would be an exercise in prophecy. Yet
143. 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
144. Id. at 243, 442 A.2d at 1006.
145. 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
146. Id. at 293; accord Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1984).
147. Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 293.
148. 252 Ga. 441, 444, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1984) (per curiam).
149. 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. App. 1984).
150. Id. at 1076; accord Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Public Health
Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition denied, 399 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 1981); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 349, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983).
151. 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
152. Id. at 419-20, 687 P.2d at 855; accord White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D.
21
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in cases involving the wrongful death of a child, cases in which the same
problems exist, courts do not hesitate to permit an award of damages.
The continuing resistance of a majority of courts to award full damages
in wrongful pregnancy actions has led to further refinement and clarifica-
tion of the benefit offsetting approach.
E. Recovery Based on Parents' Harmed Interest Offset By Benefits
The difficulties courts have experienced in setting damages in wrongful
pregnancy cases stem from viewing the claim as one for the birth of a
child. A different analytic approach views the claim as one for expenses
resulting from the birth of a child.' 54 While other approaches consider
the injury to be the product of the negligent act, i.e., the healthy child,
this approach emphasizes that the injury is the burdens-which the par-
ents have tried to avoid by sterilization-forced upon them as a direct
and foreseeable consequence of the physician's negligence.'55 Refocusing
from the child to the parents provides a different approach for calculat-
ing damages. The question that courts must ask is what interest the
plaintiff sought to protect in attempting to avoid procreation, i.e., what
was the parents' motivation or reason for undergoing a sterilization oper-
ation? Once the interest of the plaintiff has been determined and dam-
ages have been proved, the court must determine whether the tortfeasor
has conferred upon the plaintiff a benefit with regard to that interest.
The Hartke court identified three different reasons for undergoing ster-
ilization: socioeconomic,1 56 eugenic, 15 7 and therapeutic."5 8  In these
three circumstances, different parental interests are impaired when the
physician's negligent operation results in conception, pregnancy, and
birth. Damages in turn depend on both the harm and the benefits con-
ferred upon the interest that the parents sought to protect. The reason
for choosing sterilization, as observed by the Hartke court,
is in effect a calculation of the way in which [the parents] anticipate the
costs of child birth to outweigh the benefits. That calculation, untainted
by bitterness and greed, or by a sense of duty to a child the parents have
brought into the world, is usually the best available evidence of the extent
to which the birth of the child has in fact been an injury to them.
159
Kan. 1981); Public Health Trust, 388 So. 2d at 1086; James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 878 n.l
(W. Va. 1985).
153. 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
154. This approach has been suggested by courts and commentators but was delineated for the
first time in Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 983 (1983). See
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
155. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435-36 (1984).
156. Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1553-54 (to prevent financial burden and/or effect on lifestyle).
157. Id. (to prevent the birth of a physically and/or mentally impaired child).
158. Id. (to prevent harm to the mother's physical and/or mental health).
159. Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1555.
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In cases of eugenic sterilization"6 the injury contemplated by the par-
ties at the time of sterilization is the birth of an impaired child. If a
healthy child is born, the interest that the parents sought to protect re-
mains unharmed. In this case, just damages would cover the costs of the
unsuccessful sterilization and any emotional distress suffered by the par-
ents up to the time they knew that their child would be born healthy and
unimpaired. If, on the other hand, the child is born impaired, then the
damages should be similar to those awarded in wrongful birth cases. The
parents sought to avoid the birth of an impaired child; hence, costs asso-
ciated with the impairment should be awarded. Such damages would
include extraordinary pecuniary costs associated with the physical or
mental impairment as well as emotional distress.
In cases of therapeutic sterilization 161 the injury sought to be avoided
at the time of sterilization is the impairment of the mother's health. If
the mother remains well throughout pregnancy and delivery, then the
contemplated injury does not occur. In such cases, damages should be
limited to the costs of the unsuccessful sterilization operation and any
emotional distress arising from the anticipated effect of pregnancy and
childbirth on the mother's health. If, however, the mother's health was
impaired and the parents incurred medical costs and costs for child rear-
ing assistance, then these costs would be recoverable in addition to all
pregnancy related costs.
In cases of socioeconomic' 62 sterilization, the parents clearly seek to
avoid the economic burden of a child. Even if the child is born healthy,
the interest that the parents sought to protect has been harmed. Just
damages should include liberal child rearing costs. In a dissenting opin-
ion, Judge Ferren of the District of Columbia observed that "[i]n a case
where plaintiff can prove that financial straits motivated sterilization...
[plaintiff] seeks compensation only for provable financial injury for physi-
cian malpractice. Accordingly, this would not be a financial windfall;
• . .[plaintiff] would merely be sustained in the tight financial position
she found herself in before the physician's negligence."' 163 Of course, any
emotional damages would be offset by any emotional benefits from hav-
ing a child.
When the reason for sterilization is more social than economic, the
interest the parents seek to protect at the time of sterilization is harder to
identify," 4 and the damages are harder to assess. Lifestyle or career dis-
160. See supra note 11.
161. See supra note 10.
162. See supra note 12.
163. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1082 (D.C. App. 1984) (Ferren, J.,
dissenting).
164. Comment, Recovery of Childbearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motivational
Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1195 (1983).
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ruption may have a financial aspect but such disruption may also be com-
pletely non-pecuniary. In the latter situation, offsetting damages by non-
pecuniary benefits of child-rearing may drastically reduce the award.
61
Occassionally plaintiffs possess more than one reason for a decision to
undergo sterilization. 6 6 In a footnote, the Hartke court observed that
the motivational analysis is not a cureall:
This approach will be primarily useful in cases in which the evidence of
the reason for undergoing sterilization is unambiguous and overwhelm-
ing, as it is in this case. Where there is a mixture of motivations, and the
socioeconomic reasons are at least a but-for reason for undergoing the
operation, the trier of fact will have to look to more direct, but perhaps
less reliable, evidence of whether the birth of a child constitutes damage
to parents.' 
67
However, damages will most accurately reflect the injury suffered if the
defendant pays for the very risks that the plaintiff sought to avoid and
those risks come to pass.168 Cases decided subsequent to Hartke have
incorporated this rationale. In University of Arizona Health Sciences
Center v. Superior Court 169 and Jones v. Malinowski,171 the courts indi-
cated that the trier of fact must inquire into the parents' motivation for
undergoing the sterilization operation.' 7' The Jones court held that, as a
prerequisite to recovery, the interest harmed by the negligent sterilization
must be the same interest that the sterilization was meant to protect.
Thus, a physician is not liable for child-rearing costs every time a child is
born subsequent to a sterilization procedure on one of the parents. A
physician would be liable for these costs only when the plaintiffs prove
the physician was negligent, and the fact finder determines that the eco-
nomic interest of the parents was harmed.
71
IV. CONCLUSION
The tort claim of wrongful pregnancy has been recognized in almost
all jurisdictions presented with the issue. However, courts are in disa-
greement on the question of damages. Four different approaches have
been used. Early courts denied all damages on the theory that the birth of
165. Id. at 1196.
166. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 260, 473 A.2d 429, 430 (1984) (plaintiff sought to avoid
another pregnancy for economic reasons and to prevent recurrence of prior traumatic experiences
with pregnancy and childbirth, i.e., first child - breach birth, second child - congenital brain
disease, third child - congenital heart disease); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 248, 391 P.2d 201,
203 (1964) (plaintiff sought to avoid expense of childbirth and rearing; obstetrician advised against
pregnancy after plaintiff's delivery of three children by Caesarian section in as many years).
167. Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1555 n.12.
168. Id. at 1555.
169. 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (en banc).
170. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
171. Id. at 272, 473 A.2d at 437.
172. Id. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436.
24
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol16/iss1/5
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY DAMAGES
a child was a blessed event. A few courts have awarded all damages and
costs associated with childbearing and child rearing without an offset.
These two approaches, by far the most extreme, have received little sup-
port. Most courts have resorted to either of two middle ground ap-
proaches. The majority of courts allow the recovery of damages
associated with the pregnancy and delivery and deny child-rearing costs.
A minority of courts allow the recovery of all damages and apply the
benefits rule to offset damages by benefits received.
Viewed simply as a negligence case, the negligent physician is responsi-
ble for the expenses which are reasonably foreseeable consequences of his
actions. When stripped of its emotional and value overtones, the issue
remains one of compensation for an injury. Courts should not rule as a
matter of law that public policy considerations always outweigh the eco-
nomic burden to parents. Parents who seek sterilization have already
decided that for them the burdens outweigh the benefits. Such a decision
is not an indication that the parents view the child's life as having little
value. A decision not to have a child is certainly no more a denigration
of the value of a child's life than is the thought that accidental procrea-
tion reflects a true appreciation of the value of life. Tortfeasors should
not be immunized from full accountability for their tortious conduct just
because their negligence results in human life. Juries should be allowed
to consider all the arguments and, based on their own experience, weigh
all factors when ruling on the issue of damages.
Complete recovery in wrongful pregnancy cases will deter negligence,
hold tortfeasors accountable for their wrongs, and compensate parents
who deliberately attempted to prevent childbirth. The benefits rule
should be applied to offset benefits of the same interest. Only interests
harmed by the negligence should be compensated. The avoidable conse-
quences doctrine should also be applied on a case-by-case basis.
ADA F. MOST
25
Most: By What Measure: The Issue of Damages for Wrongful Pregnancy
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1986
26
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol16/iss1/5
